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1 
Power Transition and U.S.-China Relations: 





What can U.S.-China interactions since 1990 foretell the trend of this most important bilateral 
relationship in the 21st century? This article explores whether and how a potential power transition 
from the United States to China will take place peacefully in the future. Historically power transitions 
from a dominant nation to a challenger almost always led to wars. While some progress has been made 
in accounting for the causes and consequences of wars associated with power transitions, little 
research has been done on the problem of peaceful management of power transitions in the 
international system.   
Theoretically, this research expands the Organskian power transition proposition and advances 
peace studies by analyzing factors contributing to systemic changes at international, domestic, societal 
and individual levels. After reviewing the U.S.-China relations since 1990 at all four levels, the author 
draws a tentative conclusion that a potential power transition from the United States to China is most 
likely to be peaceful. Policy recommendations are provided for managing this complex relationship in 
the early decades of the 21st century in order to promote peace and avoid another human tragedy 
associated with power transition.  
 




U.S.-China relations are arguably the most important and consequential bilateral ties in 
the 21
st
 century. As Chinese power continues to grow and expand, many worry about the 
future of U.S.-China relations and international security. Some compare today’s China to 
pre-World War I Germany. With growing economic and military might, China, it is assumed, 
will probably challenge the existing international system violently and force a global 
confrontation just like what Germany did. It is therefore interesting and imperative to study 




Since 1990, U.S.-China relations have experienced many ups and downs. What is the 
status of U.S.-China relations today? What can we learn about the future trajectory of the 
bilateral relations from their interactions in the past? Historically, power transitions from a 
dominant nation to a challenger almost always led to large-scale systemic wars. As one 
leading realist international relations scholar observed, peaceful power transition in the 
                                                          
1
 For U.S.-China relations in general, see David M. Lampton (2001), Ezra F. Vogel, ed. (1997), James 
Mann (1999), Michael Schaller (2002), Christopher Marsh and June Teufel Dreyer, eds. (2003), 
Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro (1997).  For great power relations in general, see some of the 
recent works such as Benjamin Miller (2003), John J. Mearsheimer (2002), and William R. Thompson 
(1998).  
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international system had a very low probability (Robert Gilpin, 1981: 15).
2
 While some 
progress has been made in accounting for the causes and consequences of wars associated 
with power transitions, little research has been done on the problem of peaceful management 
of power transitions in the international system. Based on theoretical exploration and 
empirical examination, this article surveys U.S.-China interactions since 1990 and predicts 
the future development of the bilateral ties in the context of a potential power transition.  
Theoretically, this research expands the Organskian power transition proposition and 
advances peace studies by analyzing factors contributing to systemic changes at international, 
domestic, societal and individual levels. It applies the theory to specific analysis of U.S.-
China relations. The article asserts that a multilevel analysis can better explain and predict 
power transitions in the international system. Using a modified new framework, this paper 
reviews U.S.-China relations since 1990 at all four levels and investigates whether the two 
countries can manage a potential power transition smoothly. Based on the findings of 
generally positive interactions between the two countries, the paper concludes with an 
optimistic note that a potential power transition from the United States to China is most 
likely to be peaceful. The paper also offers policy recommendations on how to manage this 
complicated bilateral relationship in the early decades of the 21
st
 century in order to avoid 
another major war in the international system associated with global power transition.  
 
 
2. THE POWER TRANSITION THEORY 
                                                  
China’s rise in the late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 centuries will probably become one of the most 
significant and most frequently written and read chapters in any future book of international 
politics and world history. China’s reemergence may challenge the United States as the 
dominant global and Asia-Pacific regional power. This is not unusual since great powers rise 
and fall.
3
 The rise of Iberian powers, the Ottoman Empire, the Hapsburg Empire, the United 
Provinces, Spain, France, Germany, and Japan during different periods from 1400 to 1900 all 
led to violent systemic changes. The cyclical war associated with power transitions in history 
prompted historian E.H. Carr (1964: 208-23) to identify the “problem of peaceful change” as 
the central dilemma of international relations. “Great powers emerge from great wars,” 
declared a renowned international relations scholar (Knutsen 1999: 21). Literature that 
accounts for power transition and its linkage to war abounds in international relations and 
history. Historians and international relations scholars such as Arnold Toynbee, Quincy 
Wright, Charles Doran, Robert Gilpin, Immanuel Wallerstein, George Modelski, Paul 
Kennedy, and Torbjorn Knutsen have all discerned a pattern or cycle of major wars 
associated with systemic changes in world politics.  
But it was political scientist A.F.K. Organski (1958) who, in his World Politics, first and 
more explicitly linked power transition to wars between great powers and called attention to 
the danger that probability of war may increase during a period of power transition (Organski 
                                                          
2  “Although ...... peaceful adjustment of the systemic disequilibrium is possible, the principal 
mechanism of change throughout history has been war, or what we shall call hegemonic war (i.e., a 
war that determines which state or states will be dominant and will govern the system).” 
3 For a fascinating account of the rise and fall of great powers, see Paul Kennedy (1987) and Torbjorn 
L. Knutsen (1999). 
 




1958; Organski and Kugler 1980). A direct challenge to classic realism that claims the 
international system is anarchic, Organski and other power transition theorists contend that 
the international system is hierarchical, and that in each historical era a single dominant state 
leads the international order as head of a coalition of satisfied powers. As long as the leader 
of this status quo coalition enjoys a preponderance of power, peace is maintained. But when 
power reaches parity, i.e. when a dissatisfied challenger begins to overtake the status quo 
power, wars are most likely to break out. Power transition theorists emphasize “power 
parity” and “dissatisfaction with the status quo” as crucial elements contributing to the risk 
of system-transforming war. The theory is based primarily on changes in the distribution of 
power in the international system. “The cornerstone of power transition theory is that parity 
is the necessary condition for major war” (Kugler and Lemke 1996: 4). The basic hypothesis 
is that the probability of war increases as the power gap narrows, especially as a rival 
dissatisfied challenger comes closer to equalizing the capabilities of the once stronger 
guardian of the international status quo. 
If a rising power is dissatisfied with the status quo, like the pre-WWI Germany, then a 
violent power transition is expected. When both powers are satisfied with the international 
status quo, the actual overtaking is most likely to be peaceful. This was the case of the 
United States and Great Britain in the early 20
th
 century. The United States’ overtaking of 
Great Britain did not threaten the structure of the existing international order. It simply 
reinforced existing rules.   
Ever since A.F.K. Organski first formulated it as a competing theory to counter 
traditional balance-of-power theory, power transition theory has undergone various 
modifications and expansions. Organski himself extended the theory to cover the nuclear era 
in the second edition of World Politics published in 1968. The fundamental test of the theory 
is found in Organski and Kuglers’s The War Ledger (1980). More theoretical testing and 
extensions are done by other scholars such as Bueno de Mesquita (1981), Kim (1992), Kim 
and Morrow (1992), Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), Lemke (1997), Kugler and 
Lemke (1996, 2000), DiCicco and Levy (1999), and Tammen et al. (2000), who have all 
contributed to the clarification and improvement of the theory. But the power transition 
perspective remains far from satisfactory as a theory when used to explain and predict great 
power relations both at global and regional levels. 
Power transition theory identifies one possible cause of wars between great powers, but 
there are multilevel factors that contribute to the outbreak of wars. Even theorists of power 
transition themselves reject the deterministic claim that power transition alone causes wars 
(Organski and Kugler 1980: 51).
4
 Power transition provides an opportunity for war, but for a 
war to occur, there must exist other factors, particularly the international and domestic 
constraints and the political will of decision makers on each side. Power transition theory 
falls short of acknowledging the uncertainties associated with power differentials and the 
dynamic interdependent relationship between the status quo power and the challenging 
power. It leaves out such vital variables as decision-making, statesmanship, diplomacy, and 
societal relations. From the rational choice perspective, great powers may choose to 
cooperate during a systemic change in an interdependent world if cooperation yields more 
benefits. Or as the expected utility model suggests, if the expected gains outweigh costs, a 
decision maker will probably strive for the expected benefits (Bueno de Mesquita 1985: 156-
177). War is waged with reason rather than without it.  Power transition theory reduces a 
                                                          
4 For a good exploration of the causes of war, see Greg Cashman (1993) and Stephen Van Evera (1999). 
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policy maker to the status of a passive keeper of the international structure rather than an 
agent capable of influencing and even changing the outcome of power transition.   
To study whether a power transition will lead to war, political, economic, military, 
cultural and social dimensions of great power relations have to be examined. Power 
transition theory emphasizes domestic growth as the source of national power. It only 
vaguely links domestic and international politics in one single perspective. In this respect, the 
logic of two-level games on international negotiations could provide a better explanation for 
war or peace decisions as a result of the interactions between international and domestic 
environments.
5
 Power transition theory also fails to acknowledge the importance of new 
international regimes. How globalization, deepening interdependence and multilateral 
cooperation will affect power transition is a question largely evaded by power transition 
scholars. 
An expanded theoretical framework is needed to identify multiple causes of international 
conflict and war. In his Man, the State, and War, Kenneth N. Waltz (1959) explicitly 
explored the causes of international conflict at individual, domestic and systemic levels.  
This research borrows Waltz’s “three images” and develops them into four levels of analysis: 
international, domestic, societal, and individual. Aided with the explanatory strength of the 
multilevel analysis, the power transition theory will offer a more forceful explanation about 
great power interactions. 
 
 
3. A MODIFIED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The central argument of this paper is that while power parity and dissatisfaction of the 
challenging power may be necessary conditions for wars associated with power transition, 
the process and outcome of a power transition are determined by the interactions of the 
international environment, domestic politics, societal links and individual leaders. Power 
transition provides a window of opportunity for war, but war or peace decisions are made by 
individual political leaders who base their decisions on evaluations of the overall relationship 
between the two competing powers under certain international and domestic conditions.  
This new theoretical framework treats power transition as a dynamic process and places it in 
a broader international and domestic context. Different from Organski’s historical-structural 
interpretation, this new model offers an agent-structural interpretation of power transition.  
The original power transition theory does not look at the power transition process from 
different levels of analysis. The new framework emphasizes the importance of non-systemic 
factors that have largely been ignored by structural realism such as societal links, 
personalities of leaders, domestic politics, and statesmanship. The non-systemic factors are 
critical variables to be reckoned with in understanding state behavior. This contextual, 
interactive, and integrative perspective is more nuanced and more persuasive. To elaborate 
on the new theoretical framework, the following hypotheses are proposed:  
 
General hypothesis: If the government, the public and top leaders in both the dominant 
power and the challenging power have positive evaluations of their relationship in a friendly 
international system, power transition will end in peace.   
                                                          
5 For the linkage of domestic and international politics, see Robert D. Putnam (1988: 427-460) and 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman (1992). 











































This general hypothesis can be divided into five sub-hypotheses in order to analyze 
power transition from four different levels: 
 
H1: The more accommodating the international system is towards the rising power, the less 
likely the rising power will challenge the international status quo violently. 
H2: The more a rising power respects the dominant power’s vital interests, the less likely the 
dominant power will try to block its growth.  
H3: The more the dominant power recognizes a challenger’s vital interests, the less  
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confrontational a challenger will become. 
H4: The more extensive and strong links the two societies have, the less likely there will be war 
between them. 
H5: The more efforts top leaders devote to a stable bilateral relationship, the less likely there 
will be war between the two powers. 
 
The dependent variable in this research is the dichotomized outcome of power transition: 
war or peace. Specifically, the process and outcome of a power transition are determined and 
influenced by a set of conditions at various levels of bilateral interactions. The independent 
variables are conditions, factors and circumstances at the global, domestic, societal, and 
individual levels that have direct impact on the process and consequence of power transition 
as well as on the political decisions for war or peace.  
To operationalize, Hypothesis I looks at the bilateral relationship at the international level. 
For example, does the international system maintained by the dominant power welcome the 
rise of a challenger? To what extent has the challenger been incorporated into the 
international political and economic system? Are both powers participants and defenders of 
the current international regimes? This forms the first level of analysis by looking at the 
interactions of the two powers at the international system. 
Hypotheses II and III study how perceptions and evaluations and corresponding foreign 
and domestic policies of each power affect relations between the two rivals. The “vital” 
interests include those that are considered the “core” of each country’s domestic and foreign 
policies. For example, in the case of the United States, enhancing national security, 
maintaining economic prosperity and promoting democracy and human rights are generally 
believed to be vital national interests. In the case of China, sustaining economic development 
and safeguarding national unity such as preventing Taiwan or Tibet from becoming 
independent are some of those core interests. Hypotheses II and III form the second level of 
analysis by looking at domestic politics and foreign policy of each power. 
Hypothesis IV looks at the relationship from the societal level such as trade, educational, 
cultural, personnel and other exchanges. A close bilateral relationship cannot be maintained 
by political leaders alone without solid grass-roots support. This is the third level of analysis. 
Hypothesis V, which is the fourth level of analysis, studies the impact of the perceptions, 
personalities, and evaluations of national leaders on foreign policies. How much have they 
devoted to the improvement of bilateral relations through their words and deeds? To what 
extent are diplomacy and statesmanship actively involved?   
In short, this research studies great power relations from interactions and mutual 
responsiveness at individual, societal, governmental, and global levels. This integrative 
decision-making model is crucial when analyzing and predicting power transitions in the 
international system. To further elaborate on the theoretical framework and these hypotheses, 
the paper focuses on U.S.-China relations since 1990 as a case study. Placing U.S.-China 
relations in theoretical and historical perspective, I make an assessment of how this potential 
power transition may evolve under current international and domestic environments. The 
conclusion drawn from this research is tentative, but it may provide useful implications for 
policy makers and the public in the United States and China as well as the international 









4. U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS SINCE 1990 
 
How to deal with a rising China is probably the most serious foreign policy challenge for 
the United States in the 21
st
 century. Realistically speaking, in the first two decades of the 
21
st
 century, the United States will probably remain a hyper-power unmatched in every 
dimension of national capabilities. China will not be in a position to challenge the American 
military, technological and economic supremacy any time soon. There are daunting 
economic, political, and social challenges that China has to meet now and in the near future. 
So, military conflict between China and the United States originating from power rivalry is 
unlikely in the next two or three decades. But exactly because of this, the next two or three 
decades are particularly crucial in determining the nature and the future tendency of the 
relationship between China and the United States. If they can handle this complex 
relationship constructively now, a potential power transition in the future is more likely to be 
peaceful. 
 
4.1. International Environment 
 
The post-Cold War U.S.-China relationship has been a complex mixture of contention 
and cooperation. The key factors precipitating this change were the Tiananmen incident and 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. To some extent, the Tiananmen incident fundamentally 
changed Americans’ perception of China. The image of an opening and outward-looking 
China was replaced almost overnight by the image of a ruthless dictatorship. Furthermore, 
the end of US-USSR rivalry removed the most obvious rationale for Sino-American 
cooperation in world affairs.   
At the turn of the century, especially after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, a new 
consensus seemed to be emerging in the United States with regard to the greatest threat to the 
national security. Asymmetric warfare, including terrorism, is a greater danger to U.S. 
interests and a subsequently higher strategic priority than any traditional military threat 
(Rudman 2002). According to U.S. ambassador to China Clark Randt, the September 11 
attacks demonstrated to Americans that they have real enemies, and China is not among 
them.
6
 For the United States and China, the 2001 terrorist attacks provided some breathing 
space for the tense relationship jeopardized by the spy plane incident and President Bush’s 
statement of defending Taiwan “at any costs” earlier that year. 
Nevertheless, the rise of China as a great power has never been comforting to some in the 
United States. Even during the height of war against terrorism, the hawks in the United 
States have not let down their guard against China. For example, in July 2002, two official 
reports submitted to the U.S. Congress  one by the U.S.-China Security Review 
Commission on bilateral relations and the other by the Department of Defense on China’s 
military power  both portrayed China’s surge as a threat to American interests.
7
 Since 
                                                          
6 Quoted in “Jiang Looks to U.S. for Unlikely Final Legacy,” CNN News at www.cnn.com, accessed on 
October 22, 2002. 
7  The U.S.-China Security Review Commission report, published on July 15, 2002, claims China 
presents “an increasing threat to U.S. security interests, in the Middle East and Asia in particular.”  
See the highlights of the report on the Commission’s webpage at www.uscc.gov/pr7_15.htm.  The 
Department of Defense’s report, published three days earlier, considers China’s missiles along the 
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1990 China has been frequently singled out as the most dangerous potential threat to U.S. 
national interests in military and security spheres. 
China, on the other hand, has come to see its interests inseparably aligned with those of 
the international community. China’s priority since the late 1970s has been to take advantage 
of the relatively peaceful international environment for its modernization programs. With 
some twists and turns, China’s door to the world and the West in particular has opened to the 
point where it is almost impossible to close again.  
To a great extent, the United States has helped to bring China back to the international 
stage after the end of the Cultural Revolution. Since the 1980s, through trade and investment, 
the United States has facilitated China’s modernization. Through interactions with the United 
States and other countries in the fast changing world, China has become an important 
regional and global player. Being an active member of such international and multilateral 
organizations as the United Nations and the WTO, China is helping to rewrite the global 
rules of the game.   
While opposing America’s frequent unilateral approach in international affairs and its 
high-handedness towards China on some issues, China has a basically a positive view of the 
U.S.-dominated international system. China has been taking advantage of the current 
international regime for its own development without attempting to alter it. According to 
political scientist Samuel Kim, China’s role in international organizations is distinctively 
system-maintaining, not system-altering. China is “a satisfied conservative system 
maintainer, not a liberal system reformer nor a revolutionary system transformer” (Lardy 
2002: 155). 
China’s modernization requires a peaceful international environment. This means that it 
shares an interest with the United States in maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East, 
Asia and elsewhere; preserving stable oil and commodity markets; and restricting the 
proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. China’s efforts to shore up 
regional currencies during the East Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, its willingness to 
agree to a code of conduct in the South China Sea, its work in the United Nations on 
international peace, and its cooperation with the United States in the area of arms control 
indicate that China has just as much interest as the United States in maintaining a predictable, 
rule-based international order. 
In the security arena, China and the United States have clear common interests in North 
Korea, South Asia, terrorism and stability in the Middle East. Despite disputes over Taiwan, 
human rights, and nonproliferation, U.S.-China relations remain one of the most dynamic 
and resilient and have weathered several crises since the mid-1990s. As two major players in 
regional and global affairs, the United States and China have perhaps learned the importance 






                                                                                                                                                      
Southeast China coast not only a threat to Taiwan, but a direct threat to the United States and U.S. 
interests in Japan and the Philippines. The full text of the Department of Defense report can be 
accessed at www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2002/d20020712china.pdf. 
 




4.2. Domestic Politics 
 
4.2.1. The United States 
The checks and balances mechanism ensures intense domestic debate on major issues. 
Congress and the White House may agree upon U.S. objectives towards China, but they 
often diverge on concrete policies. Traditionally, Congress has been more outspoken and 
critical of the negative aspects of the Chinese society and accordingly, has advocated tougher 
policies. The White House has tended to take a more balanced approach towards China. 
Though both Republicans and Democrats have held office in the White House since the end 
of the Cold War, China policy objectives and practices of various administrations have 
remained similar.     
Criticisms on China coming from members of Congress are often harsh. From human 
rights, rule of law, to Taiwan and Tibet, many members of Congress rarely have anything 
positive to say about China. Several members of Congress have taken a strong personal 
interest in China policy. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Frank Wolf (R-VA), for example, are 
personally identified with concern over Chinese human rights issues. Congressman Dana 
Rohrabacher (R-CA) and former Senators Frank Murkowski (R-AK) and Jesse Helms (R-
NC) are closely identified with strong U.S. support for Taiwan. Interestingly, despite its 
harsh criticism of China’s poor human rights record and its lack of respect for the rule of law, 
U.S. Congress has never funded the rule of law program for China that was announced by 
President Clinton in 1997 during his summit meeting in Washington with the Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin.  
The divergent views on China are best summarized by Henry Kissinger’s comment in 
1998: “Republicans see China as a threat; Democrats view it as a laboratory for the spread of 
American values. Both view China through the prism of their party’s experience over the last 
30 years. Unfortunately, too many Republicans have substituted China for the collapsed 
Soviet Union and seek to deal with it by the methods that accelerated the collapse of the 
Soviet empire: diplomatic confrontation, economic ostracism and ideological warfare. Too 
many Democrats act as if the principal goal of American policy should be to replicate our 
institutions and principles in China, even at the cost of our many other interests at stake in 
Asia and without regard for the complexities of Chinese history” (Brahm
 
 2001: 63). 
Since Tiananmen, there has been a hot debate in the United States between China hawks 
and China doves. Some officials see China as a strategic competitor and a potential adversary. 
Some would like to engage China so that China will turn out to be a benign power. Yet from 
a broader and longer term perspective, there is no real domestic division in U.S. policy 
toward China. Both the so-called doves and the hawks aim at neutralizing China as a 
potential threat to U.S. interests in Asia. Their difference is only one of tactics and timing. 
The doves promote “peaceful evolution” through trade and engagement while the hawks 
promote pre-emptive confrontation through military conflict. Neither advocates an all-out 
war with China. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell is widely believed to be a moderate while Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney are considered hardliners. In 
terms of the China policy, the views and policies from the State and Defense departments 
may differ. For example, on July 12, 2002, the Pentagon released its first Annual Report on 
the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China under the Bush administration. Citing 
Beijing’s deployment of missiles opposite Taiwan and its recent purchase of Russian 
weapons, the Pentagon report claims that Beijing is pursuing “a coercive strategy” to force 
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Taiwan to negotiate on Beijing’s terms and that China’s military modernization could pose a 
threat to Japan and the Philippines as well as Taiwan. The report concludes that China is 
rapidly modernizing its military with the goal of countering American power in the Pacific 
and pressing Taiwan to accept unification.
8
 These pentagon views are apparently not in line 
with what Secretary of State Powell said the day before the report was released. In a joint 
press conference with the visiting Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer on July 11, 
2002, Powell remarked that China and the United States have “good bilateral relations” and 
“we’re anxious to have more military-to-military exchanges with the Chinese.” He said that 
as China develops, some of its wealth will be used to modernize Chinese military forces. 
That itself is not “frightening” and the United States will monitor it carefully. To which point 
the Australian foreign minister added that Australia “does not have any great concerns” 
about modernization of the Chinese armed forces since “we haven’t seen any change in 
China’s strategic posture that would cause us any concern.”
9
  
Since no new consensus has been reached in the United States regarding its future 
relations with China, domestic debate over China will continue in the United States, 
especially during an election year.  
 
4.2.2. China 
Though the non-transparent character of Chinese politics makes its intentions less 
predictable, China’s policy towards the United States has been rather consistent since the end 
of the Cold War.  To quote former President Jiang Zemin, “reducing trouble and promoting 
cooperation” has been a major feature of China’s US policy. China has adopted a policy of 
keeping a low profile in international affairs while focusing on domestic development.  
As it is in the United States, there are both moderates and hard-liners in China with 
regards to their U.S. policy. The Chinese “hawks” include the People’s Liberation Army and 
some conservative scholars in government-funded think tanks. For example, hardline 
Chinese officials, angry at Washington’s invitation to Taiwan’s defense chief to attend a 
March 2002 military conference in Florida where he met with senior U.S. officials, 
demanded that Chinese Vice-President Hu Jintao’s plan to visit the United States that same 
year be cancelled.  
As a developing country, China faces enormous challenges at home.
10
 These challenges 
include but are not limited to population, environmental deterioration, ethnic separatism, and 
the rule of law. Furthermore, admission into the WTO offers China both opportunities and 
challenges. It’s “a gamble of historic proportions” (Lardy 2002: 7). Tens of millions of 
workers are unemployed in state-owned enterprises, while from 60 to 100 million surplus 
rural workers are adrift between the villages and cities, subsisting on part-time low-paying 
jobs. WTO participation also requires banking and financial systems reform, and the 
establishment of the rule of law. All these challenges, together with the Communist Party’s 
                                                          
8  “New Pentagon Report Sees Rapid Buildup by China,” The New York Times, July 13, 2002.  
Accessed online the same day from http://www.nytimes.com. 
9 The transcript of the July 11 2002 joint press conference can be found on the website of the Embassy 
of Australia in Washington, D.C. at http://www.austemb.org.  Interestingly, the same transcript cannot 
be found at the U.S. State Department website, which only contains reports about Australian Prime 
Minister’s visit to the United States.   
10 These enormous challenges prompt some people to think that China is going to fail in the next 20 
years or so.  See, for example, Gordon G. (2001).  This author does not take such a pessimistic view. 




task to sustain rapid economic growth and maintain national unity and stability to prolong its 
legitimacy in power, will keep China busy for quite some time.  
Complex domestic issues will prevent foreign relations from rating high on the policy 
agenda; when they do, they will tend to be viewed in the context of linkages to the domestic 
economy, society and polity. For its ambitious modernization program, China wants U.S. 
trade and investment; but it also wants a non-hierarchic relationship with the United States. 
The imperatives of China’s economic modernization require cooperation with the United 
States. Yet China’s domestic politics dictate that cooperation cannot be at the expense of 
core Chinese interests such as Taiwan.  
 
4.3. Societal Links 
 
4.3.1. Public Sentiment 
The Chinese public has demonstrated a feeling of hope and disillusionment towards the 
United States. This is best illustrated by the phenomenon that some of the students who 
protested and threw rocks at the U.S. embassy in Beijing after the U.S. military hit the 
Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999 appeared at the U.S. embassy the next day to apply 
for a visa to come to the United States. 
Indeed, Chinese views of the United States are mixed. On the one hand, the United States 
is seen as a democratically governed, economically prosperous, technologically advanced 
country  a trading partner vital to China’s economic growth. On the other hand, the 
American government is seen as arrogant and overbearing that harbors hegemonic ambitions. 
The Chinese public’s favorable images of America’s domestic achievements have not 
changed much despite the ups and downs in the bilateral relationship. According to Dr. 
Wang Jisi of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, most average Chinese have two 
different perceptions of America. Domestic issues received positive responses. Chinese 
views of American foreign policy, especially in Asia, are negatively viewed and often 
marked by perceptions of American hegemony.
11
 Chinese envy America’s wealth, stable 
political system, and advanced technology; but there are also mixed feelings on America’s 
crime rate. “Democratic inward, hegemonic outward,” summarizes Zi Zhongyun, a leading 
America scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Thomas and Zhao 2001: 31). 
Some Chinese are pessimistic about the long term prospects of the bilateral relationship. 
For some, the future is uncertain at best. “China and the United States will always confront 
each other,” according to Shen Dingli, deputy director of the Center for American Studies at 
Shanghai’s Fudan University. “They are fundamentally different, and they should collide” 
because “they look to their own interests.”
12
 Yet in one survey conducted in 2001, though 
seventy percent of Chinese participants believed that Americans see China as the greatest 
threat to U.S. security, the majority of the Chinese surveyed (70 to 80 percent) also felt 
increasingly optimistic about the future of U.S.-China relations. Significantly, at the Central 
Party School, eighty-five percent felt optimistic about a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan 
issue, despite the widespread resentment of what they see as U.S. interference.
13
 
                                                          
11 “China-United States Sustained Dialogue,” Program Brief, the Nixon Center, Washington, D.C., 
March 19, 2002.  
12  “Year after Spy Plane Crisis, China-US Ties Face New Uncertainty,” AFP news from Yahoo! 
Singapore at http://sg.search.yahoo.com/search/news, accessed on April 1, 2002.  
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Interestingly, some authors and novelists in both the United States and China are now 
obsessed with the prospect of a future conflict between the two countries. The Coming 
Conflict with China and Dragon Strike are just some of the recent titles by American authors 
who believe an American conflict with China is inevitable and advocate forceful 
containment of China (Bernstein and Munro 1997; Hawksley and Holberton 1999). While 
Zhongguo keyi shuo bu (China Can Say No) and Quanqiuhua yinmou xia de Zhonguo zhi lu 
(China’s Road: Under the Conspiracy of Globalization) are some of the Chinese books 
demonstrating strong nationalistic sentiments. 
In general, many Chinese greatly admire America’s inroads in technology, science, 
computers, finance, and management. American products are immensely popular. Young 
Chinese seem to have been seduced by American culture and ideology. Coca-Cola and 
McDonald’s are hailed in China as symbols of modernity. Yet, nationalism is also strong, 
especially when the Chinese feel they are wronged (again) by the United States. Many 
Chinese do not understand why the current PRC government, the most liberalizing regime in 
Chinese history, is the one most attacked by U.S. media, politicians, and intellectuals — the 
same groups that in many cases tolerated both Mao Zedong’s and Chiang Kai-shek’s 
dictatorships.  
Comparatively speaking, ordinary Americans know far less about China than ordinary 
Chinese know about America. Most often, the first impressions of China held by Americans 
are hazy and based on bits of information gleaned from various sources: newspapers, movies, 
books, Chinese restaurants, etc. According to a research done by the Kettering Foundation 
based on community forums on U.S.-China relations across the Untied States in 2000, 
ordinary Americans’ views of China are ambivalent and their image of China is a work in 
progress. In every forum, participants called for a more accurate picture of China and of the 
Chinese people.
14
 The participants in these forums ranged from youth to elders from all 
major racial groups, college and high school students, university faculty, veterans of the 
Korean and Vietnam Wars, and business people. On the issue of China’s rise, while some 
participants saw China as a threat, many of these citizens saw opportunities in the 
possibilities for a strong China-U.S. relationship. Many participants wanted constructive 
engagement with China and a deep interdependent relationship with China to create a secure 
world. While the participants did not envision military conflict with China, they strongly 
believe that human rights and individual freedoms are the ideals to which China should 
conform. In general, they are more concerned about China’s domestic development than its 
foreign policy posture. 
While some people in both countries consider one another as the greatest threat or 
potential threat, the majority in both countries seem to disagree. China and the United States 
may not be natural allies or even close friends, but the two countries can certainly establish a 
mature relationship and become normal partners in the international community. More 
exchanges between the two peoples are needed to facilitate better understanding of one 
another’s history, culture, domestic and foreign policies.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
13 “China-United States Sustained Dialogue,” Program Brief, the Nixon Center, Washington, D.C., 
March 19, 2002.  Many of these surveys were conducted between April 1 and September 11, 2001.  
The terrorist attacks on America may have influenced some of these perceptions about America. 
14 “U.S.-China Dialogue Research Report, October 2000” in Thomas and Mei (2001: 2-21). 




4.3.2. Strong and Extensive Ties 
In an era of globalization, extensive economic and trade relations help soothe difficulties 
in the security area. Though extensive ties alone may not be enough to deflect conflicts, 
strong economic, social, cultural and other interactions between the two countries serve as a 
stabilizer and balancer against the ups and downs in the political and security relations.   
Despite such episodes as the Tiananmen Square tragedy, Taiwan Strait missile crisis, 
Chinese embassy bombing, and EP-3 spy plane incident in the past decade or so, the two 
countries have maintained a rather dynamic working relationship. Bilateral trade probably 
has the strongest support in both societies. Extensive economic and trade relations have 
become the most fundamental the strongest link between the two countries. The United 
States is China’s number two trading partner while China ranks number four in America’s 
foreign trade. The bilateral trade volume exceeded US$100 billion in 2003. By 2002, the 
paid-in value of U.S. investment in China had exceeded US$35 billion, making it the largest 
source of foreign investment in Chinese mainland after Hong Kong.
15
 According to China’s 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation the United States can overtake Japan 
as China’s largest trading partner by 2005.
16
 American investment and technology play a 
positive role in China’s modernization. Since the early 1980s, American businesses have 
rushed to provide China with everything from financial services to convenience stores. In 
return, China’s growing economy benefits American consumers with a wide choice of 
inexpensive and high-quality products. 
Trade relations are just part of the extensive linkage between the two countries. The 
strong ties are also reflected by other exchanges between the two societies. For example, the 
two governments have reached more than 30 official agreements on cooperation in the 
political, economic, cultural, educational and other fields. China remains one of the top 
Asian destinations for American tourists. In 1979-80, only about 1,000 Chinese students 
were studying in the United States and almost no American students were studying in China. 
Today there are over 60,000 Chinese students studying in the United States and more than 
5,000 American students studying in China.
17
 China is one of the top countries to send 
students to the United States; the PRC students comprise about 10 percent of all international 
students studying in the United States.
18
 According to a study by the Institute of International 
Education, the number of American students studying in China has increased dramatically 
over the past five years. In 2001, for example, of the total 8,834 American students enrolled 
in Asia, 2,949 (over one-third) were studying in the PRC.
19
  
                                                          
15 Hu Jintao, “Enhanced Mutual Understanding and Trust Towards a Constructive and Cooperative 
Relationship between China and the United States,” speech in Washington, D.C., May 1, 2002.  
According to Nicholas R. Lardy(2002: 158) with the Brookings Institution, bilateral trade turnover 
(the sum of exports and imports) grew from $1billion in 1978 to $116 billion in 2000.  
16 Quoted in “Jiang Sets off for Final U.S. Tour,” CNN News, October 20, 2002, accessed online at 
http://www.cnn.com the same day.  
17 Hu Jintao, “Enhanced Mutual Understanding and Trust Towards a Constructive and Cooperative 
Relationship between China and the United States,” speech in Washington, D.C., May 1, 2002.  
18The Institute of International Education data, accessible from IIE’s webpage at www.opendoorsweb. 
org. 
19 “Highlights from Open Doors 2001” at IIE’s website at www.opendoorsweb.org. 
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In another example of close social connections, more than 5,000 Chinese children were 
adopted by American families in 2000 alone.
20
 Even the epidemic disease of SARS in 2003 
has not prevented many American parents from going to China to pick up their adopted 
children. Also, as an indication of expanding trade and personnel contact between China and 
the United States, transportation authorities of the two countries reached agreement in 2004 
to drastically increase commercial flights before 2010. Under the agreement, the number of 
weekly commercial flights between the two nations aboard U.S.-based airlines will rise from 





4.4. Top Leaders 
 
If top leaders strive for a normal relationship, the relationship will most likely be smooth. 
President George H.W. Bush was committed to stabilizing the relationship and believed he 
understood both Chinese and American interests. In 1990 and 1991, he relied on his 
authority in foreign policy and his domestic popularity to wage an uncompromising battle 
against his congressional critics for the extension of China’s most-favored-nation status.  In 
retrospect, without Bush’s personal attention and efforts, U.S.-China relations could have 
been much more problematic in the early 1990s given the strong international and U.S. 
domestic outcry against Chinese government’s handling of the Tiananmen student 
demonstrations.  
President Bush had a deep, lifelong interest in foreign affairs and devoted much attention 
to Sino-American relations following the 1989 Tiananmen incident. He considers himself as 
a China hand and is called “an old friend of the Chinese people” by the Chinese government, 
yet in fact he was not so “friendly” to China during the later days of his presidency. In an 
effort to garner more votes for his re-election, he approved the sale of 150 F-16 fighter jets to 
Taiwan in August 1992, then the largest sale of the most advanced weapons to Taiwan since 
1979. This move appears rather contradictory from his other conciliatory policies towards 
China, including his dispatch of secret envoys to Beijing following the bloody incident at the 
Tiananmen Square. Nevertheless, President Bush’s efforts to prevent Sino-American 
relations from further deteriorating after 1989 are to be commended.   
As power passed from George H.W. Bush to William Jefferson Clinton, U.S. national 
leadership shifted from a man who personally cared about American relations with China to 
one who saw China through the eyes of advisers with competing agenda. As the new 
administration set about examining its worldwide responsibilities, China did not command a 
high priority. But as culpable as Clinton might have been for not vigorously attacking the 
difficulties in the U.S.-China relationship, it is not true that he sought to isolate China or to 
punish it for the human rights violations that he deplored.  
That China received scant attention from President Clinton during his first term does not 
mean he had no intention or did nothing to improve the relationship. In September 1993 
President Clinton signed an action memorandum approving an interagency review of China 
policy. Henceforth there would be “comprehensive engagement” with frequent visits and 
                                                          
20 “U.S.-China Ties Still Strong,” Associated Press News, May 31, 2001 at http://dailynews.yahoo. 
com/htx/ap/20010531/pl/us_china_life_goes_on_3.html. 
21 “U.S.-China Flights to Increase,” USA Today, June 20, 2004, accessed online 21 June 2004. 
  




regular exchanges between high-level civilian officials, renewal of military-to-military 
contacts suspended since June 1989, and a Clinton-Jiang summit during the approaching 
Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Seattle. The crisis in U.S.-China 
relations over Taiwan in 1995 and 1996 also prompted the Clinton administration to pay 
more attention to China policy. It was during his second term that Clinton’s China policy 
gathered momentum. He and President Jiang Zemin exchanged state visits and announced 
the formation of “strategic partnership” between the two countries. During the last two years 
of his presidency, though troubled by his personal scandals, President Clinton managed to 
score foreign policy points by striking a deal with China about China’s WTO admission.   
Shortly after taking office in January 2001, President George W. Bush and his hawkish 
foreign policy team repeatedly provoked China on the sensitive Taiwan issue. In addition to 
selling or proposing to sell large amount of advanced weapons to Taiwan and perceptibly 
upgrading U.S.-Taiwan relations, President Bush openly declared in April 2001 that the 
United States would do whatever it takes to defend Taiwan. This new rhetoric, as the 
Chinese government complained, will probably only embolden and encourage separatist 
forces in Taiwan. No wonder many people including Richard C. Bush, former Chairman and 
Managing Director of the American Institute in Taiwan believe that on balance there is no 
compelling reason for the United States to state in advance the details of its response to the 
use of force against Taiwan. Spelling out exactly what the United States would do is not a 
good idea (Bush 2001: 197). Others warn that writing a blank security check to Taiwan could 
drag the United States into a deadly conflict with China (Lampton 2002). 
President George W. Bush, despite his straightforward talk about Taiwan, attended the 
APEC conference in Shanghai in November 2001, his first foreign travel after the September 
11 attacks. He paid an official working visit to Beijing in February 2002 during his three-
nation Asia tour. It is unusual but significant for a U.S. president to visit a foreign country 
twice within several months. The Bush administration has also apparently backed down from 
its overly pro-Taiwan rhetoric earlier. In August 2002, in response to Taiwan President Chen 
Shui-bian’s “one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait” statement, the White House 
National Security Council spokesman remarked that the United States adheres to the “one 
China” policy and does not support Taiwanese independence.
22
 In May 2002, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, considered a hardliner in the Bush administration, also 
mentioned that the United States would not support Taiwan’s independence.
23
 And in 
December 2003 at a White House meeting with Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, 
President Bush himself warned Taiwan leaders not to attempt to unilaterally change the 
status quo across the Taiwan Strait (Lakely 2003).  
George W. Bush is merely the most recent in a series of U.S. presidents who took office 
pledging more forceful policies towards the PRC only to be reconciled eventually to the need 
for continued cooperation with China.  Jimmy Carter in 1976, Ronald Reagan in 1980, and 
Bill Clinton in 1992 all acted in much the same fashion. This process of socialization of 
American presidents to the imperatives of cooperation with China is “largely a function of 
                                                          
22  “The U.S. Reiterates It Does Not Support Taiwan Independence,” Lianhe Zaobao (Singapore), 
August 9, 2002.  
23 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz at the Foreign Press Club, Washington, DC, May 29, 
2002.  News Transcripts from the Department of Defense’s website at  http://www.dod.gov/news/ 
May2002/briefings.html. 
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the reality of the PRC’s great national capabilities and, consequently, of the very high costs 
the U.S. risks if it fails to reach an accommodation with China,” commented China scholar 
John W. Garver (2002: 284).  
Not only top leaders in the United States have attempted to maintain a strong U.S.-China 
relationship in the past decade or so, Chinese leaders are equally if not more committed to a 
smooth and constructive relationship with the United States.  Since the early 1990s, President 
Jiang Zemin had promoted the so-called big-power diplomacy, a codename referring to 
promoting cooperative relations between China and the United States, Russia, the EU and 
Japan. His policy has been criticized by some in China as too weak and too accommodating 
to the United States especially on the Taiwan issue, the 1999 Chinese embassy bombing 
incident and the 2001 clash between an American spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet. 
President Jiang’s own evaluation of U.S.-China relations is a mixed one. During a CBS “60 
Minutes” interview with Mike Wallace on August 15, 2000, Jiang expressed his views on the 
state of the bilateral relationship: “Sometimes China-US relations are good and sometimes in 
a storm. There are certain people in America who do not want to see China and the U.S. 
having good relations. They always make some problems” (Brahm 2001: 64). 
“Increasing trust, reducing trouble, expanding cooperation, and avoiding confrontation” 
have been President Jiang’s U.S. policy guidelines (Klintworth 2001: 51). Even during rough 
times in the bilateral relations, President Jiang still tried hard to avoid direct confrontation 
with the United States. For example, he backed continued U.S.-China negotiations on 
China’s WTO admission in the second half of 1999 following the U.S. bombing of Chinese 
embassy in Yugoslavia and the publication of the sensational, later discredited, the Cox 
Report which accused China of posing a serious threat to U.S. national interests by stealing 
nuclear technology from the United States. Also, he supported Vice President Hu Jintao’s 
April 2002 maiden visit to the United States following Taiwanese defense minister’s U.S. 
visit and his meeting with senior U.S. officials at a Florida conference earlier that year. 
The fourth generation of Chinese leaders headed by President Hu Jintao and Prime 
Minister Wen Jiabao seem equally positive about developing and expanding U.S.-China 
relations. In his only public speech during his May 2002 U.S. visit, the then Vice President 
Hu Jintao called on the two nations to step up dialogue at all levels, intensify exchanges and 
cooperation in all fields, and seek common ground while shelving differences. He concluded 
by saying that the two nations will overcome interruptions and difficulties and “write a new 
chapter in the development of bilateral relations.”
24
 Since assuming the positions as 
Communist Party General Secretary and the state President in October 2002 and March 2003 
respectively, Hu has reiterated his intentions and determinations to maintain a good 
relationship with the United States each time he meets with American visitors. President Hu 
has also maintained regular telephone conversations with President Bush to exchange their 
views on regional and global issues.
25
   
At the APEC summit meeting in Chile in November 2004, President Hu and President 
Bush had a friendly discussion on issues of economic cooperation, war on terror, North 
Korea nuclear program, and Taiwan. Both leaders expressed satisfaction about the current 
                                                          
24 Vice President Hu Jintao’s speech at a dinner in Washington, D.C., May 1, 2002, accessed from the 
Chinese Embassy website at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/29640.html. 
25 “Bush to Hu: US Opposes Independence for Taiwan,” The Straits Times, May 30, 2004, accessed 
online from http://straitstimes.asia1.com the same day. 








5.  INFERENCES AND SUMMARY 
 
This short survey of post-Cold War Sino-American relations reveals the general trend of 
cooperation and competition in the bilateral relations. Despite the changeable official terms 
used to describe the relationship such as “strategic partnership,” “strategic competitors” or 
“constructive cooperative relations,” the United States and China have developed a normal 
relationship, in which they cooperate on a wide range of bilateral, regional and global issues 
but disagree and even argue over some other issues. At the beginning of the 21
st
 century, 
U.S.-China ties have strengthened and expanded into a complex relationship, often 
cooperative, sometimes contentious, but always vital to global stability. 
Generally speaking, common grounds and common interests far outweigh disputes and 
disagreements between the United States and China. Despite the many differences between 
the two countries, there is no indication that they will resort to war as a means to resolve 
them. Considerable interdependence of the two societies at multi-levels compels both 
towards mutual accommodation.  
Recalling the hypotheses for this research, the following summary is made and the 
corresponding policy recommendations are offered.  
 
H1:  The more accommodating the international system is towards the rising power, the 
less likely the rising power will challenge the international status quo violently. 
 
This research proposes that to avoid a potential conflict between China and the United 
States, the best strategy for the United States is to welcome and incorporate China into the 
international community such as the WTO, G-8 and other international organizations. 
Participation in international organizations will expose China to international norms and 
practices, including democratic institutions and civil society. China’s participation also 
ensures that China becomes a writer of new rules in a multilateral structure. It is less likely 
that China will challenge or attempt to violently alter the rules of the game that itself helped 
to write. Supporting China’s participation in the international system will not only satisfy 
China’s needs and interests, it also conforms to America’s long-term objectives to help bring 
about a peaceful, democratic and prosperous China.  
 
H2: The more a rising power respects the dominant power’s vital interests, the less likely 
the dominant power will try to block its growth.  
 
This research suggests that China needs to become more transparent in its policy making. 
It has to demonstrate, through words and deeds, that its rise will not pose a threat to its 
neighbors and that it does not intend to replace the United States as the global power or drive 
the United States out of Asia. It is encouraging that China has proposed a free trade zone 
with Southeast Asian nations to boost development in the region. It has also adopted a code 
of conduct with regards to the disputed Spratly Islands.  
Furthermore, China must understand the importance the United States attaches to the 
ideals of democracy, freedom and human rights. The United States has traditionally been a 
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Pacific power and it is not likely to withdraw from Asia due to its vital national interests in 
the region. On the Taiwan issue, while strongly opposing Taiwanese independence for the 
sake of its own national interests, the Beijing government needs to respect the American 
interests of peacefully settling the cross-Strait dispute. Without doubt, U.S. supply of 
weapons to Taiwan is partially linked to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s military 
upgrading and its perceived threat to Taiwan. It may be helpful for the PLA to gradually 
withdraw or reduce the number of short-range missiles deployed on China’s southeast coast 
opposite Taiwan, although Taiwan needs to take corresponding measures simultaneously to 
ensure that it does not intend to seek permanent separation from China. 
 
H3: The more the dominant power recognizes a challenger’s vital interests, the less 
confrontational a challenger will become.  
 
Similarly, it is in the long-term interest of the United States to respect China’s core 
interests, especially regarding Taiwan. Perhaps to bring Taiwan and mainland China together 
under a loose political framework of “one China, separate rule” acceptable to both sides of 
the Taiwan Strait is the only viable solution. This will not only guarantee Taiwan’s continued 
autonomy, freedom and prosperity, but will satisfy China’s vital interest to keep Taiwan as 
part of a unified China. To support an independent Taiwan, coupled with continued sales of 
advanced weapons to Taiwan, is an unwise and even dangerous choice for the United States. 
To accommodate the PRC on this vital issue does not mean appeasement of an aggressive 
China; and it is simply wrong to consider Beijing’s strive for national reunification as an 
indication of its aggressive foreign policy in the future.  
Realistically speaking, Taiwan’s future lies in China both economically and politically. 
Instead of burning its bridges to China, Taiwan should, as former Democratic Progressive 
Party chairman Hsu Hsin-liang has suggested, boldly go westward and cooperate with China 
during the latter’s modernization.  Taiwan can set an example for Chinese mainland to 
gradually democratize as its economy continues to expand. A more prosperous and 
democratic China with which Taiwan is closely associated serves the best interests of the 23 
million residents in Taiwan. The United States can do more to promote cross-Strait 
exchanges and dialogue. 
 
H4: The more extensive and strong links the two societies have, the less likely there will 
be wars between them. 
 
U.S.-Chinese cultural, educational, personnel and other societal exchanges at the grass-
roots level are extensive and by some calculations the strongest in the world. Economic and 
trade ties have steadily expanded and deepened.  The two Pacific countries have been closely 
linked. 
The weakest link between the two sides is perhaps the exchange between the two 
militaries. Despite extensive ties and huge trade volume between the two countries, military-
to-military exchange has been limited. On both sides, the militaries are probably the most 
hawkish forces and remain deeply suspicious of each other’s intentions. Existing exchanges 
such as those between the two national defense universities have served as a back channel 
opportunity even when times get tense. But more extensive exchanges at all levels and 
mutual understanding of each other’s intentions are crucial for confidence building between 
the two militaries.  




H5: The more efforts top leaders devote to a stable bilateral relationship, the less likely 
there will be war between the two powers. 
 
The greatest strength of the bilateral relationship lies in the common interest in expanding 
the already enormous trade and extensive societal links and cooperating in international and 
regional security issues in an era of globalization. Indeed, these factors have caused senior 
officials in both countries to stabilize a relationship that sometimes threatens to spin out of 
control. Top level visits and meetings occur regularly if not frequently. Every U.S. president 
has visited China since Richard Nixon. Major Chinese leaders have also visited the United 
States since 1979. US Secretary of State and Chinese Foreign Minister regularly talk on the 
phone. Hotlines have been established between the two presidents. Clearly, leaders from both 
sides are committed to maintaining and developing this important bilateral relationship. 
High-level contacts are symbolic of warming relations and are helpful for improving ties.  
Such exchanges and commitment at the top level should continue. 
 
General Hypothesis: If the government, the public, and top leaders in both the dominant 
power and the challenging power have positive evaluations of their relationship in a friendly 
international system, power transition will not result in war. 
 
It is an exaggeration to claim that both China and the United States are completely 
satisfied with the relationship. Nevertheless, the current status of the bilateral relationship is 
acceptable to both sides. Globalization at the international level is generally positive for a 
smooth relationship. In the broader global context, the two great powers have much more 
common challenges to deal with, such as water pollution and shortage, AIDS, SARS, 
environmental degradation, the Third World poverty and debt issues, international crimes, 
etc. In the era of globalization and deepening interdependence, China and the United States 
must seize the opportunity to expand their cooperation and become responsible players in 
international affairs. 
The hypotheses raised in this paper require further research and empirical test. As a 
tentative conclusion, this paper suggests that though the British-American style security 
community has not been, and probably will never be, established between China and the 
United States, strong links across the Pacific have tied the two societies closely together.
26
  
China and the United States have much more common interests than differences today. In 
general, both international and domestic environments are conducive to a cooperative 
relationship between the two Pacific powers. This bodes well for a potential power transition 
in the future.  Former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell remarked in a September 2003 
speech “U.S. relations with China are the best they have been since President Nixon’s first 
visit.”
27
 Mr. Powell’s assessment might be overly sanguine, but judging from the current 
state of bilateral interactions at all four levels, one can be cautiously optimistic that a 
                                                          
26 The concept of “security community” was explained in Karl Deutsch (1957). “Security community” 
based on shared culture and values is often used to account for the peaceful power transition from 
Britain to the United States in the early 20th century. Also see Bruce M. Russett (1963). This author 
does not think that “security community” is the only foundation for great power cooperation and 
peaceful coexistence.  
27  Colin L. Powell’s remarks at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington 
University, Washington, D.C., September 5, 2003.  
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